Reliance on Obfuscation or Encryption of Security-Relevant Inputs without Integrity Checking vulnerability in danielberkompas cloak allows an attacker with write access to stored ciphertext to make it decrypt to a chosen value via bit flipping. Cloak.Ciphers.AES.CTR encrypts with AES-256 in CTR mode and stores the key tag, the IV and the ciphertext with no MAC. decrypt/2 checks only the key tag and the minimum length before it returns the plaintext, and Cloak.Ciphers.Deprecated.AES.CTR decrypts the legacy format the same way. CTR is a stream cipher, so a value XORed into the stored ciphertext is XORed into the plaintext at the same offset. An attacker who can write to the encrypted store (for example through SQL injection or a compromised replica) and who knows or can guess a stored plaintext can replace it with any value of the same length. The application receives that value with no error. This issue affects cloak: from 0.1.0-pre onward.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune divulgation d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interruption de service |
Cloak AES-CTR cipher lacks ciphertext authentication, allowing chosen-plaintext forgery by bit flipping