> CVE-2026-82417 [MEDIUM]

> DESCRIPTION

### Summary `qs.stringify` throws a `TypeError` when it serializes an object whose own `constructor` property has a truthy, non-callable `isBuffer` member. `utils.isBuffer` duck-types buffers by calling `obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)` after checking only that the property is truthy, so a value such as `{ constructor: { isBuffer: "x" } }` makes the call throw `TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function`. ### Details `lib/stringify.js:127` calls `utils.isBuffer` on every non-primitive value it serializes. `utils.isBuffer` (`lib/utils.js:332`) reads `obj.constructor.isBuffer` and invokes it without verifying that it is a function. `constructor` and `isBuffer` are ordinary property names, so any object carrying them as own properties reaches the unchecked call. Such an object can be built from untrusted input. `qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true })` or `{ allowPrototypes: true }` keeps the `constructor` key as an own property (the default parse options drop it), and `JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}")` produces the same shape with no qs option involved. Express 4 with its default `query parser` setting and body-parser with `extended: true` both call `qs.parse` with `allowPrototypes: true`, so on those stacks `req.query` and `req.body` can carry the shape directly. #### PoC ```js var qs = require("qs"); qs.stringify(qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true })); qs.stringify(JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}")); // TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function // at Object.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:332:78) // at stringify (lib/stringify.js:127:45) ``` #### Fix `lib/utils.js`, applied in e83d321 on `main` and released as v6.16.0: ```diff - return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)); + return !!(obj.constructor && typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === "function" && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)); ``` Real `Buffer`, `safer-buffer`, and browserify `buffer` polyfill instances serialize exactly as before; only the throw is removed. ### Affected versions `>=2.2.5 <6.16.0`, fixed in v6.16.0. The unguarded duck-type was introduced in 3768a75 and first shipped in v2.2.5 (September 2014). v2.2.4 and earlier used `Buffer.isBuffer` and are not affected. Every release from v2.2.5 through v6.15.3 contains the unguarded call. ### Impact An unauthenticated request can make any code path that re-serializes attacker-influenced data with `qs.stringify` (for example, rebuilding a query string from `req.query` for a redirect or an upstream request, or serializing a parsed JSON body) throw synchronously. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework the throw is caught by the framework error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the process survives and other requests are unaffected. Where the call runs outside an error boundary, such as an `async` Express 4 handler (where the throw becomes an unhandled promise rejection) or a background job, the process exits, so the impact in that case depends on the application error handling rather than on qs.

> AFFECTED_PRODUCTS

> CVSS V3 METRICS

> MÉTRIQUES CVSS DÉTAILLÉES

> WEAKNESSES

> CWE DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS

> RED HAT SECURITY ADVISORIES

> GITHUB SECURITY ADVISORY

qs: Denial of Service via Attacker Controlled isBuffer

> OSV (GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE VULNERABILITIES)

qs.stringify throws TypeError on objects with a non-callable constructor.isBuffer property

> HISTORIQUE DES MODIFICATIONS

> REFERENCES