Affected versions of Flowintel allow the LOG_FILE configuration value to be modified through system settings without restricting it to a filename inside the intended log directory. Because the application constructs the log destination from this configurable value, an administrator could set LOG_FILE to an arbitrary filesystem path. Since attackers can influence logged content, this enables controlled data to be written into unintended files. The upstream commit specifically describes an exploitation chain in which an attacker injects a template into a chosen file and subsequently abuses application rendering behavior to execute code. The patch removes LOG_FILE from the web-editable settings, introduces validate_log_file_name() to reject absolute paths, traversal, Windows paths, null bytes, and directory components, and centralizes log path construction through resolve_log_file_path(). Version impacted: >=3.3.0
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
High (H)
|
Conditions spécifiques doivent être réunies pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
High (H)
|
Authentifié avec privilèges administratifs |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
High (H)
|
Interruption totale du service possible |
Flowintel Arbitrary Log File Path Allows Remote Code Execution via Template Injection