Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker who obtains a victim's OAuth2 state value to replay the callback and sign that victim into an attacker-controlled account. AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.Plug.callback/2 clears the stored session_params through a rebinding step inside its with chain, conn <- delete_session(conn, session_key). Elixir evaluates the else block in the scope enclosing the with, so every failure path (the provider returning ?error=access_denied, an invalid code, a token-exchange error, or a registration or sign-in failure) reaches store_authentication_result/2 holding the original connection and the session entry is never removed. The value the module's own comment describes as protection against a CSRF-related attack is therefore consumed only when authentication succeeds, and survives a cancelled or failed attempt until the next request phase or session expiry. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.6.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
High (H)
|
Conditions spécifiques doivent être réunies pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
Unknown (P)
|
Interaction inconnue |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
Low (L)
|
Divulgation limitée d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
Low (L)
|
Modification limitée des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interruption de service |
Replayable OAuth2 CSRF state retained after a failed callback in AshAuthentication