Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller to receive an aggregate value computed over rows a more restrictive filter should have excluded, disclosing counts, sums, or lists across an authorization or tenancy boundary. AshSql.Aggregate.different_queries?/2 reports two aggregate queries as different only when their filter and their sort both differ. Aggregate queries rarely carry a sort, so two aggregates that share a name but carry entirely different filters compare as identical. The colliding aggregate keeps its name and is treated as already computed, and select_aggregates returns the first-registered variant's value. The same name reaches the builder twice with different filters when actor or tenant context is stamped into each aggregate's query, so a narrowly filtered aggregate can be served the value of a previously registered broad one. This issue affects ash_sql: from 0.1.0 before 0.7.1.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Local (L)
|
Exploit nécessite un accès local au système |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
Low (L)
|
Divulgation limitée d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune modification de données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interruption de service |
Same-named aggregates with differing filters are conflated in AshSql