In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: gate GRO hint in geneve_gro_complete() on gs->gro_hint geneve_gro_receive() reads the GRO hint through geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), which honours it only when the socket enabled IFLA_GENEVE_GRO_HINT (gs->gro_hint). geneve_gro_complete() instead calls the low-level geneve_opt_gro_hint_off() and acts on the hint unconditionally. On a tunnel without the hint, receive aggregates the frames as plain ETH_P_TEB while complete still honours an attacker-supplied hint option: it inflates gh_len by gro_hint->nested_hdr_len (u8) and redirects the dispatch type, so the inner gro_complete handler runs at nhoff + gh_len, an offset receive never pulled nor validated, reading out of bounds of the skb head: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800fe91980 by task exploit/153 ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196) geneve_gro_complete (drivers/net/geneve.c:965) udp_gro_complete (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:940) inet_gro_complete (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1621) __gro_flush (net/core/gro.c:306) Gate the complete path on gs->gro_hint too via geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), so both paths agree. Tunnels that enable the hint are unaffected.
geneve: gate GRO hint in geneve_gro_complete() on gs->gro_hint