Crater's NotePolicy checks only a blanket Bouncer ability (manage-all-notes / view-all-notes) with no company-ownership comparison, unlike InvoicePolicy and other sibling policies which additionally verify $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). NotesController's show(), update(), and destroy() actions authorize via $this->authorize('view notes'/'manage notes') without passing the target Note model, and Note's company-scoping (scopeWhereCompany) is applied only in the list endpoint, not in show/update/destroy. Any authenticated user of one company can read, edit, or delete another company's notes by ID. This is a distinct finding from the previously reported CustomerPolicy company-ownership omission (a different policy class and controller).
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
Low (L)
|
Authentifié avec compte utilisateur basique |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
Low (L)
|
Interruption partielle du service possible |
Crater - Cross-Company IDOR on Notes via Missing Company-Ownership Check in NotePolicy