Origin Validation Error vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows untrusted notebook output JavaScript to trigger session-wide keyboard shortcuts, including forced evaluation of all cells and runtime restart. Livebook's JS-view feature renders notebook-defined JavaScript inside a sandboxed, cross-origin iframe specifically because that JavaScript is untrusted. The trusted iframe shell in iframe/priv/static/iframe/v5.html forwards every keydown event fired in its own window to the parent page without consulting Event.isTrusted, so an event synthesized by the untrusted script through window.dispatchEvent is forwarded exactly as a genuine keystroke would be. The parent-side relay in assets/js/hooks/js_view.js reconstructs and re-dispatches it on the live page with no further validation, and because assets/js/hooks/session.js registers the global shortcut handler on the document in the capture phase, that handler acts on the replicated event regardless of how it was produced. Sandboxed output JavaScript can therefore drive Livebook's session-wide keyboard shortcuts. Two of them reach LivebookWeb.SessionLive and execute immediately with no confirmation: the shortcut for queueing full evaluation runs every cell in the notebook, and the shortcut for reconnecting the runtime disconnects and reconnects it, discarding in-memory state. A third shortcut deletes the focused cell behind a confirmation dialog that the user can permanently dismiss, after which it too executes silently. Forced full evaluation is the significant consequence, because it causes the notebook's own Elixir code to run without the user choosing to evaluate anything. A user who merely opens a notebook obtained from a third party, or reached from published documentation, can have its code executed on their runtime. Livebook also mirrors cell outputs to every connected client, so a malicious output triggers in a collaborator's browser as soon as it renders. This issue affects livebook: from 0.5.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
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AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
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Network (N)
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Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
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AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
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Low (L)
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Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
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PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
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None (N)
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Aucune authentification requise |
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UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
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Required (R)
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NĂ©cessite une action utilisateur (clic lien, ouverture fichier, etc.) |
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S (Périmètre)
Scope
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Unchanged (U)
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Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
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C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
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High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
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I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
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High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
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A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
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High (H)
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Interruption totale du service possible |
JS-view sandboxed output can synthesize keyboard events to trigger unconfirmed global shortcuts