Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object. In affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context. The fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
Low (L)
|
Authentifié avec compte utilisateur basique |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
High (H)
|
Interruption totale du service possible |
MISP Core: Mass Assignment and Object Re-ownership via Unvalidated Request Fields