In OpenStack Neutron before 28.0.1, a project manager can create or update a port on a shared network owned by another project and set device_owner to a value that has "network:" at the beginning ("network:dhcp" for example). The default port RBAC policies incorrectly included PROJECT_MANAGER without requiring network ownership, allowing any project manager to obtain trusted network-service port behavior on shared networks. Depending on backend and deployment, this can bypass anti-spoofing and security group protections, enabling DHCP, MAC, or IP spoofing against other tenants on the shared network. This is a regression of CVE-2015-5240 (OSSA-2015-018).
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
High (H)
|
Conditions spécifiques doivent être réunies pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
High (H)
|
Authentifié avec privilèges administratifs |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune divulgation d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
Low (L)
|
Modification limitée des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interruption de service |
OpenStack Neutron: Neutron port RBAC policy bypass allows project managers to set trusted device owners on shared networks