UDS Identity Config builds the Keycloak configuration image (realm, plugins, theme, truststore, JARs) consumed by UDS Core's Identity deployment. In versions 0.11.0 through 0.26.0, a logic error in the `client-kubernetes-secret` Keycloak client authenticator (shipped by `uds-identity-config` and consumed by UDS Core) causes the submitted `client_secret` to be overwritten with the mounted Kubernetes secret before comparison. An attacker who can reach the Keycloak token endpoint and knows a `client_id` using this authenticator can authenticate as that client with any `client_secret` value and obtain OAuth2 tokens scoped to the client's service account. In the case of the `uds-operator` client this token can be used to registry/modify other clients. Version 0.26.1 patches the issue.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Changed (C)
|
Impact s'Ă©tend au-delĂ du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
High (H)
|
Interruption totale du service possible |
UDS Identity Config has a client authentication bypass in `ClientIdAndKubernetesSecretAuthenticator`