> CVE-2026-46223

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PUBLISHED
2026-05-28 10:16
MODIFIED
2026-05-28 10:16
EPSS (Prob. Exploit)
0.11%
Top 98.8%
DATA SOURCES:
NVD 🔗 2026-05-28 RED HAT 🔗 2026-05-31 FIRST EPSS 🔗 2026-10-25 OSV 🔗 2026-11-02

> DESCRIPTION

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Defer css percpu_ref kill on rmdir until cgroup is depopulated A chain of commits going back to v7.0 reworked rmdir to satisfy the controller invariant that a subsystem's ->css_offline() must not run while tasks are still doing kernel-side work in the cgroup. [1] d245698d727a ("cgroup: Defer task cgroup unlink until after the task is done switching out") [2] a72f73c4dd9b ("cgroup: Don't expose dead tasks in cgroup") [3] 1b164b876c36 ("cgroup: Wait for dying tasks to leave on rmdir") [4] 4c56a8ac6869 ("cgroup: Fix cgroup_drain_dying() testing the wrong condition") [5] 13e786b64bd3 ("cgroup: Increment nr_dying_subsys_* from rmdir context") [1] moved task cset unlink from do_exit() to finish_task_switch() so a task's cset link drops only after the task has fully stopped scheduling. That made tasks past exit_signals() linger on cset->tasks until their final context switch, which led to a series of problems as what userspace expected to see after rmdir diverged from what the kernel needs to wait for. [2]-[5] tried to bridge that divergence: [2] filtered the exiting tasks from cgroup.procs; [3] had rmdir(2) sleep in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE for them; [4] fixed the wait's condition; [5] made nr_dying_subsys_* visible synchronously. The cgroup_drain_dying() wait in [3] turned out to be a dead end. When the rmdir caller is also the reaper of a zombie that pins a pidns teardown (e.g. host PID 1 systemd reaping orphan pids that were re-parented to it during the same teardown), rmdir blocks in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE waiting for those pids to free, the pids can't free because PID 1 is the reaper and it's stuck in rmdir, and the system A-A deadlocks. No internal lock ordering breaks this; the wait itself is the bug. The css killing side that drove the original reorder, however, can be made cleanly asynchronous: ->css_offline() is already async, run from css_killed_work_fn() driven by percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm(). The fix is to make that chain start only after all tasks have left the cgroup. rmdir's user-visible side then returns as soon as cgroup.procs and friends are empty, while ->css_offline() still runs only after the cgroup is fully drained. Verified by the original reproducer (pidns teardown + zombie reaper, runs under vng) which hangs vanilla and succeeds here, and by per-commit deterministic repros for [2], [3], [4], [5] with a boot parameter that widens the post-exit_signals() window so each state is reliably reachable. Some stress tests on top of that. cgroup_apply_control_disable() has the same shape of pre-existing race: when a controller is disabled via subtree_control, kill_css() ran synchronously while tasks past exit_signals() could still be linked to the cgroup's csets, and ->css_offline() could fire before they drained. This patch preserves the existing synchronous behavior at that call site (kill_css_sync() + kill_css_finish() back-to-back) and a follow-up patch will defer kill_css_finish() there using a per-css trigger. This seems like the right approach and I don't see problems with it. The changes are somewhat invasive but not excessively so, so backporting to -stable should be okay. If something does turn out to be wrong, the fallback is to revert the entire chain ([1]-[5]) and rework in the development branch instead. v2: Pin cgrp across the deferred destroy work with explicit cgroup_get()/cgroup_put() around queue_work() and the work_fn. v1 wasn't actually broken (ordered cgroup_offline_wq + queue_work order in cgroup_task_dead() saved it) but the explicit ref removes the dependency on those non-obvious invariants. Also note the pre-existing cgroup_apply_control_disable() race in the description; a follow-up will defer kill_css_finish() there.

> AFFECTED_PRODUCTS

ℹ️ Aucun produit affecté n'a encore été publié par NVD pour cette CVE.

> RED HAT SEVERITY ASSESSMENT

> OSV (GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE VULNERABILITIES)

cgroup: Defer css percpu_ref kill on rmdir until cgroup is depopulated

AFFECTED PACKAGES:
Unknown / Unknown
3 versions affected
Linux / Kernel

> HISTORIQUE DES MODIFICATIONS

Première apparition
28/05/2026 10:16
Source: NVD
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 31/05/2026 05:01
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 23:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 22:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 21:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 20:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 19:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 18:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 17:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 16:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 15:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 14:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 13:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 12:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 11:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 10:31
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 09:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 08:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 07:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 06:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 05:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 04:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 03:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 02:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 01:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 00:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
N/A
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 29/05/2026 00:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
Non
Nouvelle valeur:
Oui
Total des modifications: 26 Dernière mise à jour: 5 months ago

> REFERENCES

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33fa2e6b1507a0a377a151a8826438bedad1d0b0
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93618edf753838a727dbff63c7c291dee22d656b
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