A heap-based out-of-bounds read in DcmRLECodecDecoder::decodeFrame() in dcmdata/libsrc/dcrleccd.cc of OFFIS DCMTK 3.7.0 allows an attacker to read up to 63 bytes of adjacent heap memory, or cause a crash, via a crafted RLE Lossless DICOM file whose pixel data fragment is shorter than the 64-byte RLE header. The function copies 64 bytes without checking the fragment length, a check that the sibling function decode() already performs. Applications that decode RLE images frame by frame (for example, through DcmPixelData::getUncompressedFrame()) are affected. The dcmdrle command-line tool uses decode() and is not affected. The issue is fixed in commit 45469f3c30037e9c7159290e4bb74cd7b3b9ef1d.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Local (L)
|
Exploit nécessite un accès local au système |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
Unknown (P)
|
Interaction inconnue |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
Low (L)
|
Divulgation limitée d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune modification de données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
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Low (L)
|
Interruption partielle du service possible |