nova-toggle-5 enables fliping booleans in the index. Prior to version 1.3.0, the toggle endpoint (POST/nova-vendor/nova-toggle/toggle/{resource}/{resourceId}) was protected only by web + auth:<guard> middleware. Any user authenticated on the configured guard could call the endpoint and flip boolean attributes on any Nova resource — including users who do not have access to Nova itself (for example, frontend customers sharing the web guard with the Nova admin area). The endpoint also accepted an arbitrary attribute parameter, which meant a valid caller could toggle any boolean column on the underlying model — not just columns exposed as Toggle fields on the resource. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
Low (L)
|
Authentifié avec compte utilisateur basique |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune divulgation d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interruption de service |
nova-toggle-5: Improper authorization on toggle endpoint allowed non-Nova users to modify boolean fields
nova-toggle-5: Improper authorization on toggle endpoint allowed non-Nova users to modify boolean fields