> CVE-2026-23077

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PUBLISHED
2026-02-04 17:16
MODIFIED
2026-02-04 17:16
EPSS (Prob. Exploit)
0.16%
Top 94.8%
DATA SOURCES:
NVD 🔗 2026-02-04 RED HAT 🔗 2026-02-08 FIRST EPSS 🔗 2026-11-08 OSV 🔗 2026-11-08

> DESCRIPTION

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge Patch series "mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge", v2. Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge scenarios. However, it is handling merges incorrectly when it comes to mremap() of a faulted VMA adjacent to an unfaulted VMA. The issues arise in three cases: 1. Previous VMA unfaulted: copied -----| v |-----------|.............| | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| |-----------|.............| prev 2. Next VMA unfaulted: copied -----| v |.............|-----------| |(faulted VMA)| unfaulted | |.............|-----------| next 3. Both adjacent VMAs unfaulted: copied -----| v |-----------|.............|-----------| | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| unfaulted | |-----------|.............|-----------| prev next This series fixes each of these cases, and introduces self tests to assert that the issues are corrected. I also test a further case which was already handled, to assert that my changes continues to correctly handle it: 4. prev unfaulted, next faulted: copied -----| v |-----------|.............|-----------| | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| faulted | |-----------|.............|-----------| prev next This bug was discovered via a syzbot report, linked to in the first patch in the series, I confirmed that this series fixes the bug. I also discovered that we are failing to check that the faulted VMA was not forked when merging a copied VMA in cases 1-3 above, an issue this series also addresses. I also added self tests to assert that this is resolved (and confirmed that the tests failed prior to this). I also cleaned up vma_expand() as part of this work, renamed vma_had_uncowed_parents() to vma_is_fork_child() as the previous name was unduly confusing, and simplified the comments around this function. This patch (of 4): Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge scenarios. The key piece of logic introduced was the ability to merge a faulted VMA immediately next to an unfaulted VMA, which relies upon dup_anon_vma() to correctly handle anon_vma state. In the case of the merge of an existing VMA (that is changing properties of a VMA and then merging if those properties are shared by adjacent VMAs), dup_anon_vma() is invoked correctly. However in the case of the merge of a new VMA, a corner case peculiar to mremap() was missed. The issue is that vma_expand() only performs dup_anon_vma() if the target (the VMA that will ultimately become the merged VMA): is not the next VMA, i.e. the one that appears after the range in which the new VMA is to be established. A key insight here is that in all other cases other than mremap(), a new VMA merge either expands an existing VMA, meaning that the target VMA will be that VMA, or would have anon_vma be NULL. Specifically: * __mmap_region() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping. * do_brk_flags() - expanding an existing VMA. * vma_merge_extend() - expanding an existing VMA. * relocate_vma_down() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping. In addition, we are in the unique situation of needing to duplicate anon_vma state from a VMA that is neither the previous or next VMA being merged with. dup_anon_vma() deals exclusively with the target=unfaulted, src=faulted case. This leaves four possibilities, in each case where the copied VMA is faulted: 1. Previous VMA unfaulted: copied -----| ---truncated---

> AFFECTED_PRODUCTS

ℹ️ Aucun produit affecté n'a encore été publié par NVD pour cette CVE.

> RED HAT SEVERITY ASSESSMENT

> OSV (GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE VULNERABILITIES)

mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge

AFFECTED PACKAGES:
Unknown / Unknown
Linux / Kernel

> HISTORIQUE DES MODIFICATIONS

Première apparition
04/02/2026 17:16
Source: NVD
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 08/02/2026 05:01
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 23:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 22:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 21:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 20:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 19:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 18:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 17:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 16:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 15:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 14:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 13:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
{ "severity_scale": null, "threat_severity": null }
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 12:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
N/A
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": null, "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 05/02/2026 12:30
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
Non
Nouvelle valeur:
Oui
Total des modifications: 14 Dernière mise à jour: 9 months ago

> REFERENCES

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61f67c230a5e7c741c352349ea80147fbe65bfae
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4d9dbfc1bab16e25fefd34b5e537a46bed8fc96
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