Tink-go (tink-crypto/tink-go) through 2.8.0 contains an input-validation vulnerability where keyset.NewHandleWithNoSecrets() and ReadWithNoSecrets() skip the structural Validate() step before constructing a keyset.Handle, allowing malformed public or no-secret keysets that violate Tink's keyset invariants to be accepted. Attackers can supply a malformed keyset, such as one with an enabled public key lacking a valid primary key or a DESTROYED key with no KeyData, causing inconsistent downstream validation where functions like jwt.JWKSetFromPublicKeysetHandle() process the invalid handle and produce a JWK set, potentially misleading applications that rely on successful handle construction as proof of keyset integrity.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune divulgation d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
Low (L)
|
Modification limitée des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interruption de service |
Tink-go 2.8.0 Keyset Validation Bypass via NewHandleWithNoSecrets