A missing bounds check in the binary decoder in lib0, versions 0.2.1-0.2.117 and earlier and 1.0.0-rc.32 and earlier, lets any unauthenticated remote peer read adjacent process memory and receive it back. `readUint8Array` never compares the wire-supplied length against the decoder's own view, so one over-long length prefix returns whatever the host process allocated next: other tenants' document content, personal data, and live bearer session tokens**, recovered in full and at will. An attacker who can supply bytes to a lib0 decoder which means any peer that can open a socket, including before authentication reads adjacent process memory and, where the consumer echoes, stores or re-serves the decoded value, receives it back. This is patched in version 0.2.118 and 1.0.0-rc.33.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Changed (C)
|
Impact s'Ă©tend au-delĂ du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune modification de données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interruption de service |
lib0 `readUint8Array` performs an unbounded read past the end of the decoder’s view, disclosing adjacent process memory