OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the password reset workflow does not enforce that the username submitted in the final reset request matches the account for which the reset process was originally initiated. After obtaining a valid reset link for any account they can receive email for, an attacker can alter the username parameter in the final reset request to target a different user. Because the system accepts the supplied username without verification, the attacker can set a new password for any chosen account, including privileged accounts, resulting in full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
Low (L)
|
Authentifié avec compte utilisateur basique |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
High (H)
|
Interruption totale du service possible |
OrangeHRM is Vulnerable to Account Takeover Through Unvalidated Username in Password Reset Workflow