> CVE-2025-40230

« BACK_TO_HOME
PUBLISHED
2025-12-04 16:16
MODIFIED
2025-12-04 16:16
EPSS (Prob. Exploit)
0.23%
Top 86.4%
DATA SOURCES:
NVD 🔗 2025-12-04 RED HAT 🔗 2025-12-07 CVE PROJECT 🔗 2026-01-19 FIRST EPSS 🔗 2026-11-08 OSV 🔗 2026-10-04

> DESCRIPTION

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: prevent poison consumption when splitting THP When performing memory error injection on a THP (Transparent Huge Page) mapped to userspace on an x86 server, the kernel panics with the following trace. The expected behavior is to terminate the affected process instead of panicking the kernel, as the x86 Machine Check code can recover from an in-userspace #MC. mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 0: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 3: bd80000000070134 mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffff8372f8bc> {memchr_inv+0x4c/0xf0} mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC afff7bbff88a ADDR 1d301b000 MISC 80 PPIN 1e741e77539027db mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:d06d0 TIME 1758093249 SOCKET 0 APIC 0 microcode 80000320 mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii' mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal local machine check The root cause of this panic is that handling a memory failure triggered by an in-userspace #MC necessitates splitting the THP. The splitting process employs a mechanism, implemented in try_to_map_unused_to_zeropage(), which reads the pages in the THP to identify zero-filled pages. However, reading the pages in the THP results in a second in-kernel #MC, occurring before the initial memory_failure() completes, ultimately leading to a kernel panic. See the kernel panic call trace on the two #MCs. First Machine Check occurs // [1] memory_failure() // [2] try_to_split_thp_page() split_huge_page() split_huge_page_to_list_to_order() __folio_split() // [3] remap_page() remove_migration_ptes() remove_migration_pte() try_to_map_unused_to_zeropage() // [4] memchr_inv() // [5] Second Machine Check occurs // [6] Kernel panic [1] Triggered by accessing a hardware-poisoned THP in userspace, which is typically recoverable by terminating the affected process. [2] Call folio_set_has_hwpoisoned() before try_to_split_thp_page(). [3] Pass the RMP_USE_SHARED_ZEROPAGE remap flag to remap_page(). [4] Try to map the unused THP to zeropage. [5] Re-access pages in the hw-poisoned THP in the kernel. [6] Triggered in-kernel, leading to a panic kernel. In Step[2], memory_failure() sets the poisoned flag on the page in the THP by TestSetPageHWPoison() before calling try_to_split_thp_page(). As suggested by David Hildenbrand, fix this panic by not accessing to the poisoned page in the THP during zeropage identification, while continuing to scan unaffected pages in the THP for possible zeropage mapping. This prevents a second in-kernel #MC that would cause kernel panic in Step[4]. Thanks to Andrew Zaborowski for his initial work on fixing this issue.

> AFFECTED_PRODUCTS

ℹ️ Aucun produit affecté n'a encore été publié par NVD pour cette CVE.

> RED HAT SEVERITY ASSESSMENT

THREAT SEVERITY
Moderate

> OSV (GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE VULNERABILITIES)

mm: prevent poison consumption when splitting THP

AFFECTED PACKAGES:
Unknown / Unknown
Linux / Kernel

> HISTORIQUE DES MODIFICATIONS

Première apparition
04/12/2025 16:16
Source: NVD
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 19/01/2026 17:37
CVEPROJECT
Champ modifié: CVE Project
Ancienne valeur:
Non
Nouvelle valeur:
Oui
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 07/12/2025 04:01
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
N/A
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": "Moderate", "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 07/12/2025 04:01
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
Non
Nouvelle valeur:
Oui
Total des modifications: 3 Dernière mise à jour: 9 months ago

> REFERENCES

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fc0a7c99e973a50018c8b4be34914a1b5c7b383
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/841a8bfcbad94bb1ba60f59ce34f75259074ae0d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92acf4b04f255d2f0f6770bb0d0a208d8ffb2b77
« BACK_TO_HOME