> CVE-2025-38349

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PUBLISHED
2025-07-18 08:15
MODIFIED
2025-08-19 06:15
EPSS (Prob. Exploit)
0.18%
Top 92.0%
DATA SOURCES:
NVD 🔗 2025-10-18 RED HAT 🔗 2025-10-18 CVE PROJECT 🔗 2026-01-19 FIRST EPSS 🔗 2026-11-08 OSV 🔗 2026-11-08 MSRC 🔗 2026-06-01

> DESCRIPTION

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then doing a mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx); afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free. That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after it has unlocked the mutex. But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody *else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're still using the mutex. Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership, even if they guarantee mutual exclusion. A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the first user is still cleaning up. See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst, in particular the section [1] about semantics: "mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore" So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops _their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it. Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex: the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently about object lifetimes).

> AFFECTED_PRODUCTS

ℹ️ Aucun produit affecté n'a encore été publié par NVD pour cette CVE.

> RED HAT SECURITY ADVISORIES

Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update
An update for kernel is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (C...
Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update
An update for kernel is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (...
Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update
An update for kernel is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.6 Extended Update Support. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulner...
Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update
An update for kernel is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10.0 Extended Update Support. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulne...

> RED HAT SEVERITY ASSESSMENT

THREAT SEVERITY
Moderate

> OSV (GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE VULNERABILITIES)

eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex

AFFECTED PACKAGES:
Unknown / Unknown
16 versions affected
Linux / Kernel
ALIASES:
A-432751421, ASB-A-432751421

> HISTORIQUE DES MODIFICATIONS

Première apparition
18/07/2025 08:15
Source: NVD
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 18/10/2025 15:06
CVEPROJECT
Champ modifié: CVE Project
Ancienne valeur:
Non
Nouvelle valeur:
Oui
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 18/10/2025 12:10
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Sévérité Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
N/A
Nouvelle valeur:
{ "threat_severity": "Moderate", "severity_scale": null }
📊 ENRICHISSEMENT 18/10/2025 12:10
REDHAT
Champ modifié: Red Hat
Ancienne valeur:
Non
Nouvelle valeur:
Oui
Total des modifications: 3 Dernière mise à jour: 1 year ago
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