Conda-build contains commands and tools to build conda packages. Prior to version 25.4.0, the conda-build recipe processing logic has been found to be vulnerable to arbitrary code execution due to unsafe evaluation of recipe selectors. Currently, conda-build uses the eval function to process embedded selectors in meta.yaml files. This approach evaluates user-defined expressions without proper sanitization, which allows arbitrary code to be executed during the build process. As a result, the integrity of the build environment is compromised, and unauthorized commands or file operations may be performed. The vulnerability stems from the inherent risk of using eval() on untrusted input in a context intended to control dynamic build configurations. By directly interpreting selector expressions, conda-build creates a potential execution pathway for malicious code, violating security assumptions. This issue has been patched in version 25.4.0.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
|
AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
|
Network (N)
|
Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
|
AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
|
Low (L)
|
Peu de conditions requises pour exploiter |
|
PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
|
None (N)
|
Aucune authentification requise |
|
UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
|
None (N)
|
Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
|
S (Périmètre)
Scope
|
Unchanged (U)
|
Impact reste dans le périmètre du composant compromis |
|
C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
|
High (H)
|
Divulgation totale d'informations |
|
I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
|
High (H)
|
Modification totale des données possible |
|
A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
|
High (H)
|
Interruption totale du service possible |
Conda-build Allows Arbitrary Code Execution via Malicious Recipe Selectors