In Tensorflow version 2.3.0, the `SparseCountSparseOutput` and `RaggedCountSparseOutput` implementations don't validate that the `weights` tensor has the same shape as the data. The check exists for `DenseCountSparseOutput`, where both tensors are fully specified. In the sparse and ragged count weights are still accessed in parallel with the data. But, since there is no validation, a user passing fewer weights than the values for the tensors can generate a read from outside the bounds of the heap buffer allocated for the weights. The issue is patched in commit 3cbb917b4714766030b28eba9fb41bb97ce9ee02 and is released in TensorFlow version 2.3.1.
| Métrique | Valeur | Interprétation |
|---|---|---|
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AV (Vecteur d'Attaque)
Attack Vector
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Network (N)
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Exploit possible à distance via réseau (HTTP, API, etc.) |
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AC (Complexité d'Attaque)
Attack Complexity
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High (H)
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Conditions spécifiques doivent être réunies pour exploiter |
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PR (Privilèges Requis)
Privileges Required
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Low (L)
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Authentifié avec compte utilisateur basique |
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UI (Interaction Utilisateur)
User Interaction
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None (N)
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Aucune interaction utilisateur nécessaire |
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S (Périmètre)
Scope
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Changed (C)
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Impact s'étend au-delà du composant compromis |
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C (Impact Confidentialité)
Confidentiality Impact
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High (H)
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Divulgation totale d'informations |
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I (Impact Intégrité)
Integrity Impact
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High (H)
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Modification totale des données possible |
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A (Impact Disponibilité)
Availability Impact
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High (H)
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Interruption totale du service possible |
Heap buffer overflow in Tensorflow