> The president has called for AI leadership. Here’s the mission.

America leads the world in artificial intelligence. As it should. But tech leaders keep warning, with alarming frequency, that we are at risk of losing control. President Donald Trump has called for an AI czar and an “AI Force.” The details remain unclear, but the announcement underscores something fundamental. A technology this consequential demands clear leadership, accountability and action inside the U.S. government. The question now is what that leadership should do. That question became more urgent last week when Google disclosed that its Gemini AI model gained unauthorized access to three real companies during testing. The incidents follow similar disclosures involving models from Anthropic, OpenAI and Meta. While there has been a lot of discussion on if AI is spinning beyond human control, what these episodes factually demonstrate that powerful AI systems can take consequential actions developers never anticipated or designed for. The answer isn’t to retreat from AI leadership. It’s to lead—and simultaneously build the safeguards we need to stay in control. The promise of AI is enormous. It is already expanding access to information, improving productivity and creating opportunities across the economy. But so are the stakes, especially for the digital systems underlying everything we rely on as a society: energy, water, telecommunications, transportation, finance and more. Take energy as an example: many U.S. utilities are using AI tools and predictive analytics to give plant personnel early warning of equipment problems. Yet AI agents with authority to change equipment settings or take systems offline could themselves fail, exceed their intended authority or be manipulated by adversaries. In extreme cases, the lack of control doesn’t just mean the power goes out, it means we’ve lost the ability to get the lights, heat and telecom systems back online. At Auburn University’s McCrary Institute, we focus on cybersecurity threats to our nation’s critical infrastructure. Experience has taught us that warnings accomplish little unless someone has the authority, resources and responsibility to act. The time to act is now. Whether that responsibility ultimately sits with an AI czar, an “AI Force,” existing agencies, or some combination of the three matters less than the mission. A new title or organization will accomplish little without clear objectives, authorities and accountability. We propose an AI Assurance Compact – a framework for action among the makers of AI models, government, and the owners and operators of our nation’s most critical digital systems. The goal is to ensure that America leads the development of AI while ensuring that we can credibly manage its power and risk. This compact is built around three principles: capability, that ensures the U.S. remains AI dominant; control, through constant testing and clear accountability; and continuity that ensures essential services can stay operational and recover when AI fails, is compromised, or must be disconnected. When demonstrated risks outpace available safeguards, frontier development should be deliberately paced, including temporary limits or pauses where risks cannot be adequately controlled. To their credit, leading American developers have responded to emerging risks with transparency, stronger safeguards and, in some cases, pauses or limits on development and access. But we cannot assume that voluntary restraint alone will protect the public interest or America’s strategic advantage. The country’s competitive landscape demands systemic discipline. Nor can we assume the next warning will come from an American company. If a Chinese frontier developer reaches a dangerous capability first, American security cannot count on predictable warnings, transparency or restraint. America’s strategic competitors are all-in on AI. Anthropic reported malicious actors using AI in cyber operations, surveillance and weapons-related work. Keeping a human in the loop is not sufficient when that human intends to attack us. The Compact would prompt action by: Requiring ongoing, embedded independent evaluation at frontier labs, covering training pipelines, internal use and deployment. Evaluators need employee-comparable access to relevant systems and evidence, protected reporting channels and freedom to publish safety findings, with narrow confidentiality safeguards. High-consequence systems should pass independent review before release, with renewed scrutiny after material changes. NIST can establish common criteria with sector agencies. Requirements should follow risk, regardless of a model’s origin or whether its weights are open or closed. Establish enforceable checkpoints when capabilities materially exceed demonstrated safeguards. Developers should present a credible safety case before proceeding with high-consequence activities; uncertainty cannot automatically count as permission. Where risks cannot be adequately controlled, designated authorities must be able to require limits or temporary suspension until independently reviewed evidence supports proceeding. Require rapid reporting of serious incidents to appropriate government authorities and affected organizations, along with preservation of evidence. Providers should share actionable warnings with one another and affected defenders so an actor removed from one service cannot simply continue elsewhere unnoticed. AI in essential services needs rigorous guardrails before deployment. Operators need evidence specific to the task and operating environment, enforceable limits on authority, notice of material changes and tested fallback arrangements. Government, independent labs and operators should test failures across interconnected systems. Smaller operators need shared testing, technical assistance and recovery expertise—not another unfunded mandate. A backup plan should count only when it works under stress. Finally, whatever structure the White House ultimately chooses should execute on the Compact’s principles by driving implementation, setting deadlines and ensuring that infrastructure operators and public-interest representatives have a seat at the table. Internationally, the United States should explore crisis-communication mechanisms with other major AI powers, including strategic competitors, to reduce the risk that a serious AI-related incident escalates through miscalculation. If that ultimately means some version of a “red phone” for AI, so be it. Such mechanisms should reduce the risk of unintended escalation without creating new constraints on legitimate national security activities. America’s domestic safeguards and defensive investments cannot depend on agreement abroad. No framework, or new government office, can guarantee control of whatever AI becomes. But clear leadership, accountability and tested safeguards can improve our ability to manage the risks. America cannot win the AI race only to lose control of the systems on which our country depends. The President has called for action. The mission now should be clear. Preserve America’s AI advantage, maintain control and ensure that our essential systems continue to operate when technology fails, is compromised or must be disconnected. Our nation’s most critical systems are already benefiting from the power of AI. They should. But pulling the plug on AI cannot mean pulling the plug on the community. Frank Cilluffo is director of Auburn University’s McCrary Institute for Cyber & Critical Infrastructure Security and served as a special assistant to President George W. Bush following September 11. Nick Sellers is the institute’s associate director and chief operating officer and a former senior executive at Alabama Power and Southern Company. The post The president has called for AI leadership. Here’s the mission. appeared first on CyberScoop.