> Meta Muse AI app flaw lets local malware redirect dictation traffic

Meta made much of the security of its AI assistant app Muse at launch earlier this month, calling out the app's reliance on Muse Secure VM. "Each person stays in control of their Muse and decides how much access it gets," the ad biz declared, echoing prior expansive claims about the privacy of its data gathering business. But Meta's musing about Muse appears to be a bit overstated: an attacker capable of executing local code may be able to gain more access than a Muse user might expect. Security researcher Patrick Wardle, founder of nonprofit Objective-See, has devised a proof-of-concept called not-a-mused for what he describes as a local zero-day in the Muse macOS app that allows an unprivileged local process to redirect Muse's dictation traffic and potentially abuse access granted to the app. Muse, he explains in the project repo, has an undocumented setting called endo_voyager_dictation_endpoint that an attacker running code locally can modify without special privileges to redirect dictation traffic to an attacker-controlled endpoint, potentially exposing dictated audio and prompts sent to the backend AI model. The flaw could enable prompt injection, the theft of authentication material, and abuse of whatever access the user has granted to Muse. The vulnerability is not an issue for a remote attacker. It requires the ability to run local code. So the main concern, says Wardle, is that the vulnerability gives local malware far broader access than it would have otherwise. Essentially, it's a privilege escalation vulnerability. In a phone interview with The Register, Wardle likened the situation to living in an apartment building. "Just because a bad neighbor moves in doesn't mean that that neighbor automatically has access to all the apartments," he said. Apple, said Wardle, has done a really good job with its Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework, which manages access to sensitive data on macOS, and with privilege separation. But his concern is that AI apps undo these barriers because they request or require so much access to data and tools. Of AI apps, he said, "they're super convenient and super empowering. But they have so much access if you configure them to be useful. They basically could do anything on your computer." As such, he said, they become potentially a single point of failure that breaks operating system security controls. "You know these AI companies have really great AI models for finding bugs," said Wardle. "Are they not running them against [their own apps]? Is the priority not the security of their own apps?" Wardle said that endpoint detection and response (EDR) software has gotten better on macOS largely because everything is code signed, so it's easy to identify processes that are not notarized and should not be allowed to run. But with AI agents given broad permissions and access, the EDR product can't tell whether commands are coming from the user, an agent, or an attacker. These agents need access, said Wardle, in order to be useful to people. What's missing from the makers of AI apps, he said, is a sense of responsibility for the level of access their apps seek. Wardle added that Apple provides on-device local dictation and if Meta chose to use that API, this vulnerability would not exist. Instead, he suggested, Meta chose not to use Apple's service, presumably because it wants access to that data. "I think some of their greediness for user data kind of opens the door, makes a bigger attack surface," he said. "But at the end of the day, these AI companies, they're racing for what's next. User privacy and security, those aren't priorities." Meta did not immediately respond to a request for comment.®